自我与他人（丹·扎哈维） Self and Other
基本信息
Format:Paperback / softback 296 pages
Publisher:Oxford University Press
Imprint:Oxford University Press
ISBN:9780198776673
Published:3 Nov 2016
Weight:458g
Dimensions:157 x 233 x 20 (mm)
信息仅供参考，具体以实物为准
书籍简介
【编辑推选】
扎哈维以传统现象学研究出发，透过爬梳心灵哲学与几个重要经验分析对自我和他人进行论述。于本书中，他探讨长年以来两个阵营——一方是自我中心思考的自我观，另一方是社会中心的、关系性的与有机的自我观——之间的论辩，思考以下问题：「自我」是出于己身而成或是要与「他人」共同构成？自我性是经验建构或是社会建构的结果？我们到底要如何认识他人？如果移情同感是认识他人的途径，这又如何向我们揭示自我性的本质与社会性认知？过于强调一人称优先的论述难道就不能对主体际有满意的解释？主体际性必要以一人称优先为前提吗？这些问题在在显示出，「自我」是个多面向的现象，若想对其复杂性有全盘了解，就必须作概念的区辨与阐明，再收纳、整合诸多不同层次的分析。
------------------
你能独立成为一个自我，还是只能与他人一起成为一个自我？自我是经验的固有特征还是社会建构的特征？我们到底是如何理解他人的？同理心是否等同于并允许对他人的独特体验式了解？如果是，这对我们了解自我身份和社会认知的本质有何启示？对意识的一人称特性的大力强调是否会阻碍对主体间性做出令人满意的解释，或者说前者是否是后者的必要条件？
丹-扎哈维（Dan Zahavi）的新书《自我与他人》（Self and Other）结合经典现象学、心灵哲学和各种实证学科的辩论和研究成果，为这些问题提供了答案。扎哈维讨论了自我意识、现象外在论、无意识应对、镜像自我识别、自闭症、心智理论、具身模拟、共同注意、羞耻感、时间意识、具身、叙事性、自我失调、表现性和无我论等不同主题，他认为，任何意识理论，如果想认真对待我们体验生活的主观维度，就必须认可一种极简主义的自我概念。但与此同时，他也认为，对自我的充分说明必须承认其多面性，如果我们要公正地对待其复杂性，就必须整合各种互补的说法。因此，虽然扎哈维认为基本的自我并不是由社会建构的，也不构成对他人的依赖，但他也承认自我的某些层面和自我体验的某些类型是以他人为中介的。本书的后一部分通过对羞耻感的仔细分析来体现这一观点。
Can you be a self on your own or only together with others? Is selfhood a built-in feature of experience or rather socially constructed? How do we at all come to understand others? Does empathy amount to and allow for a distinct experiential acquaintance with others, and if so, what does that tell us about the nature of selfhood and social cognition? Does a strong emphasis on the first-personal character of consciousness prohibit a satisfactory account of intersubjectivity or is the former rather a necessary requirement for the latter?
Engaging with debates and findings in classical phenomenology, in philosophy of mind and in various empirical disciplines, Dan Zahavi's new book Self and Other offers answers to these questions. Discussing such diverse topics as self-consciousness, phenomenal externalism, mindless coping, mirror self-recognition, autism, theory of mind, embodied simulation, joint attention, shame, time-consciousness, embodiment, narrativity, self-disorders, expressivity and Buddhist no-self accounts, Zahavi argues that any theory of consciousness that wishes to take the subjective dimension of our experiential life serious must endorse a minimalist notion of self. At the same time, however, he also contends that an adequate account of the self has to recognize its multifaceted character, and that various complementary accounts must be integrated, if we are to do justice to its complexity. Thus, while arguing that the most fundamental level of selfhood is not socially constructed and not constitutively dependent upon others, Zahavi also acknowledges that there are dimensions of the self and types of self-experience that are other-mediated. The final part of the book exemplifies this claim through a close analysis of shame.
作者简介
丹·扎哈维（Dan Zahavi）生于1967年，是丹麦哲学家。丹·扎哈维出生于丹麦哥本哈根，父亲是以色列人，母亲是丹麦人。他一开始在哥本哈根大学学习现象学，于1994年在比利时鲁汶天主教大学的胡塞尔档案馆获得博士学位，鲁道夫·贝内特（Rudolf Bernet）担任其博士生导师。2002年，他34岁时成为哥本哈根大学哲学教授和主体研究中心主任。2018年，丹·扎哈维成为牛津大学哲学教授。
他于 2001 年当选为国际哲学研究所成员，2007 年当选为丹麦皇家科学与文学院成员。2001 年至 2007 年，他担任北欧现象学学会主席，目前是《现象学与认知科学》的联合主编。扎哈维的系统工作主要是研究自性、自我意识和主体间性的本质。他重要的著作包括：《胡塞尔与跨时空的主体间性》（Husserl und die transzendentale Intersubjektivit?t，Kluwer，1996 年）、《自我意识与异性》（Self-awareness and Alterity，西北大学出版社，1999 年）、《胡塞尔的现象学》（Husserl's Phenomenology，斯坦福大学出版社，2003 年）、《主体性与自性》（Subjectivity and Selfhood，麻省理工学院出版社，2005 年），以及与肖恩-加拉格尔合著的《现象学心智》（The Phenomenological Mind，Routledge，2008 年）。
Dan Zahavi is Professor of Philosophy and Director of Center for Subjectivity Research at the University of Copenhagen. He was elected member of Institut International de Philosophie in 2001 and of the Royal Danish Academy of Sciences and Letters in 2007. From 2001 to 2007 he served as president of the Nordic Society for Phenomenology, and he is currently co-editor in chief of Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences. In his systematic work, Zahavi has mainly been investigating the nature of selfhood, self-consciousness, and intersubjectivity. His most important publications include Husserl und die transzendentale Intersubjektivit?t (Kluwer, 1996), Self-awareness and Alterity (Northwestern University Press, 1999), Husserl's Phenomenology (Stanford University Press, 2003), Subjectivity and Selfhood (MIT Press, 2005), and, with Shaun Ghallagher, The Phenomenological Mind (Routledge, 2008).
